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In a recent Cato Institute paper, Swaminathan S. Anklesaria 
Aiyar (2009) asserts that the International Monetary Fund’s 
special drawing rights (SDRs) cannot rival the US dollar, as 
suggested by the Chinese central bank governor (Zhou Xiao-
chuan 2009). “The SDR is not a currency and never can be,” 
Swami declares confidently in the first paragraph of his paper. 
He presents two arguments, which are presumably supposed to 
be proofs of this proposition. In the next paragraph, he tells us:
…its value is defined as the value of a weighted basket 
of four currencies…. Its value fluctuates with the value 
of its constituent currencies. This should make it clear 
that the SDR is not a currency in its own right. Rather, 
it is a derivative of four national currencies. A derivative 
is not a currency.
How interesting. The value of the pound sterling used to 
be defined as equal to a weight of gold under the gold standard. 
The value of the dollar was so defined until 1971, although it 
is true that in the later years there were certain difficulties in 
accessing the gold. The value of the renminbi was defined in 
terms of the dollar until July 21, 2005. Are we to understand 
that Swami does not consider the pound, dollar, and renminbi 
to  have  been  currencies?  Did  the  willingness  to  accept  the 
currencies have nothing to do with their moneyness? Or is it the 
fact that an SDR is defined in terms of more than one currency 
that makes it a non-money? Is the ruble then a non-money since 
it is defined as a basket of the dollar and euro (admittedly it has 
some margins)?
Toward the end of Swami’s paper, one finds another propo-
sition, which looks intended to be a proof: 
The dollar is a hard currency because the United States 
has a huge GDP and the capacity to tax its citizens to 
satisfy all currency requirements. The IMF has no GDP 
and no taxing capacity, and so lacks the fundamental 
requirements for creating a currency. U.S. and Euro-
pean politicians may occasionally agree to an expanded 
role for SDRs, but will never surrender money-creating 
power to the IMF.
Wait a minute. When I accept a dollar bill, I do so not 
because I expect to hand it over to the US Treasury in return for 
some taxes on the US GDP. I accept it because I do not doubt 
that someone else will accept the dollar bill. It is money because 
it is universally and without hesitation accepted in settlement 
of debts. This was recognized when the SDR was created. Fritz 
Machlup (1968, 65–66) wrote: 
The new facility established by the Rio Agreement…
disposes of the old myth of backing. In so doing, the 
officials of the Fund and of the negotiating governments 
showed a far greater courage than the academic econo-
mists have had. Not that any reputable economist of our 
time has believed the old myth; but they were convinced 
that all bankers and other practical men of the world 
of finance believed in the myth and could not possibly 
be “enlightened.” Thus, the academic economists had 
not dared to recommend schemes that would do away 
with the trappings of backing. …All that matters for the N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 2 0    seP t e m b e r   2 0 0 9
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acceptability of anything as medium of exchange is the 
expectation that others will accept it. If over a hundred 
central banks or national monetary authorities includ-
ing those of the major trading nations of the world 
agree to accept SDRs from one another in exchange 
for convertible currencies, this is all that is needed to 
establish the moneyness of the SDRs in inter-central 
bank transactions. Money needs takers, not backers; the 
takers accept it, not because of any backing, but only 
because they count on others accepting it from them.
Swami is asserting that money has to be backed by taxing 
capacity rather than creditworthy assets, but the fallacy is the 
same.
It is true that SDRs are only central bank money, because 
only  central  banks  accept  them  in  settlement  of  debts.  But 
to the extent that they are so accepted, they are money. The 
fact that they are created by a political decision in the IMF, 
which involves US and European politicians (as well as some 
others), does not prevent the IMF from creating money. It just 
means the politicians continue to control the process of money 
creation, which is hardly news. 
The MoneTary DoMain
In  recent  writings,  both  Richard  Cooper  (2009)  and  Barry 
Eichengreen (2009) have asserted that a major expansion in the 
role of the SDR depends on making it an asset that is held by 
the private sector. This would obviously be necessary for the 
SDR to rival the dollar in private use; one can hardly have a 
currency that competes with the dollar in private use if private 
parties are not even allowed to hold it. And I agree that it is not 
obvious that private agents would rush to hold a great volume 
of SDRs if only they were not prohibited from holding them. 
The SDR could nevertheless play a far more central role 
in the international monetary system than it has done so far 
without changing the proscription on its holding by the private 
sector. The fact is that countries with substantial dollar holdings 
have accepted an obligation to convert SDRs into dollars when 
a monetary authority needs them to transact with the private 
sector, and so far these countries have not hesitated in fulfilling 
that obligation when asked to do so by the IMF. That is, as Fritz 
Machlup observed many years ago, what is needed to establish 
that SDRs are money so far as central banks are concerned. The 
question is whether SDRs are a better asset for central banks to 
hold given this minor inconvenience in using them when one 
wants to intervene in the exchange market. 
There appear to be four differences from the viewpoint of a 
non-reserve-currency country. First, there is this inconvenience. 
Second, unless a central bank has views at variance with those 
of the private sector, the expected yield of the SDR is the same 
as that of any of the currencies that compose it. However, the 
variance is different: Given that the SDR is defined as a basket, 
the variance of an SDR will be less in terms of the liabilities of 
a typical country. (Countries whose transactions are predomi-
nantly with the dollar or dollar bloc countries are the important 
exception here.) 
The third difference is in terms of what economists call 
“seigniorage,” which refers to the profit that accrues to whoever 
issues money. If one had to buy gold and then issued gold 
money of an equal value, there is no seigniorage. If, on the other 
hand, one has the right to print paper money at essentially zero 
cost, then seigniorage is the issue value of the money printed. 
(That is why many of us believe that central banks need to be 
given an objective like 2 percent inflation to guide their money 
creation.) The usual view is that the seigniorage of running a 
reserve currency arises from an ability to borrow more cheaply 
than would otherwise be possible. The seigniorage from SDR 
creation is very differently distributed, in proportion to IMF 
quotas (which determine the proportion of allocations). Doubt-
less this too is imperfect, but it seems closer to what most people 
would consider reasonable than alternatives.
The fourth difference relates to securing consistency in the 
payments objectives sought by countries around the world. Over 
the  quinquennium  2003–07  inclusive,  payments  outcomes 
were  roughly  those  shown  in  table  1.  Developing  countries 
(including  emerging  markets)  built  up  substantial  reserves, 
financed slightly over 50 percent by current account surpluses 
and slightly under 50 percent by capital inflows. In the coming 
quinquennium, reserve build-up by developing countries will 
hopefully prove somewhat smaller, since a number of countries 
have now achieved any reasonable estimate of required reserves. 
On  the  other  hand,  many  developing  countries  have  surely 
learned the lesson from the Great Crisis of 2007–09 that it 
is prudent to build up substantial reserves in anticipation of 
possible crises. Hence it would be unwise to rely on reserve 
accumulation by these countries being much less in the future. 
If the past is any guide to the future, the bulk of this accumula-
tion (in the absence of substantial SDR allocations) will take the 
form of current account surpluses, which will require either a 
It is true that…only central banks 
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continuation of the large current account deficits of the United 
States or a move toward deficit on the part of the collectivity 
of other advanced economies. Since the former is undesirable 
and the latter improbable, it is apparent that large SDR alloca-
tions could play a key role in ensuring that payments objectives 
are consistent. Indeed, the surprise revealed by this approach is 
just how large the scope for SDR allocations would be—several 
times the size of that agreed by the Group of 20 (G-20) in April 
2009 in London, which itself multiplied the SDR stock by 
almost ten. (Creation of a substitution account may be regarded 
as an ex post way of reaching the same end.)
Chinese inTeresTs
The serious issue that needs to be addressed in assessing whether 
to replace the dollar’s reserve role is whether it is in the national 
interest of major countries. Both Swaminathan Aiyar and my 
colleague Arvind Subramanian (2009) have argued that it is a 
mistake for China to urge an increase in the role of the SDR 
instead of waiting until the renminbi can become a reserve 
currency. The issue seems to me to be a lot less clear-cut than they 
assert. They argue that countries that become reserve-currency 
countries have historically run current account surpluses for 
a  substantial  period,  which  makes  them  creditor  countries, 
establishes their credibility in the markets, and enables them 
to continue enjoying hard-currency status even after they start 
running deficits. These countries are able to do this in part by 
virtue of the “exorbitant privilege” of running a reserve currency, 
since foreign official holders demand their currency. The ques-
tion is how much of a privilege this is and whether it might 
be outweighed by the danger of a run on the currency and the 
constraint this places on national economic policy.
Let us try and look at costs and benefits from the stand-
point of China. In the short run, the Chinese would lose less 
from a dollar depreciation if they switched a large part of their 
reserves into SDRs, e.g., because the rest of the world agrees to 
the proposal for a substitution account. Of course, they would 
benefit less from a possible dollar appreciation as well, but 
presumably they regard this possibility as less likely. Assuming 
there is indeed a net dollar depreciation in the coming years, 
someone has to bear the cost. The normal rule is that a coun-
try’s accounts with the IMF are denominated in SDRs. If this 
were perpetuated in the case of a substitution account, then 
the United States would bear the cost of a dollar depreciation. 
A second possibility is that the substitution account would 
hold dollars and that all the members of the IMF would make 
up any losses (and take any profits) that might result from 
the dollar changing in terms of the SDR, e.g., by having the 
IMF utilize part of its gold stock. A third possibility is that the 
IMF would aim to maintain a balanced book, so that when 
its substitution account acquired dollars it would (doubtless 
gradually) sell 56 percent of these in exchange for euros, yen, 
and sterling. In that event the substitution account would not 
give permanent relief against the pressures resulting from a 
run out of the dollar, though it would presumably prevent 
acute pressures from sudden shifts in expectations. But in each 
of these three cases China would lose less by a dollar deprecia-
tion if it had previously placed its dollars in the substitution 
account (or acquired SDRs that had been part of the alloca-
tion process) than if it was still holding dollars.
In the medium run, before the renminbi could become a 
reserve currency, a policy of SDR allocations would give China 
the benefit of sharing in the seigniorage that results from reserve 
creation. This is the only way that China can obtain a share of 
the benefits of reserve creation in the medium term. Once again, 
it is apparent that SDR allocation dominates a policy of resist-
ing the SDR and continuing to rely on reserve currencies. This 
is true even if one dismisses the likely costs of global instability 
from moving toward a multiple reserve currency system1 and 
1. Those who dismiss this danger as fantasy may be interested to hear of one 
never-consummated research project that was started at the Institute for 
International Economics in the early 1980s. We sought to establish whether 
there had indeed been (net) destabilizing reserve switches in the 1970s. I con-
cluded that there had been and presented the evidence with some satisfaction 
and mild amusement at a seminar in one of the mid-sized European central 
banks. To my surprise, I was greeted by a stony silence. A friend explained to 
me afterwards that the central bank in question had moved a large stock of 
reserves into the yen just before it peaked and lost a bundle in consequence. 
Central bankers are not good speculators, perhaps because that is not among 
their terms of reference. They nevertheless speculate if given the opportunity. 
Against this it is sometimes argued that the consequence of competition 
among potential reserve-currency countries may be healthy competition that 
promotes better policies. Even if this is what drives the reserve switches, that 
hardly guarantees that they are stabilizing.
Table 1     Payments imbalances, 2003–07  
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n.a. = not available
Notes: The East Asian newly industrialized countries are now classified as 
advanced economies and accounted for $0. trillion of their reserve accumula-
tion. US capital inflows include the acquisition of assets by other countries that 
these countries count as reserve increases. The US reserve change recorded is the 
change in US holdings of reserve assets.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook and International 
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the likely costs of an ongoing global imbalance from continuing 
to rely on the dollar as the dominant reserve currency.
But it is the ability to run a larger deficit in the long run 
if the renminbi became a reserve currency that Swami and 
Subramanian see as the advantage to China. It is overwhelm-
ingly  likely  that  China  could  finance  a  larger  deficit  if  the 
renminbi became a reserve currency, and this should indeed 
be scored as an advantage for China. The fact that some people 
have seen net disadvantages in their countries’ reserve-currency 
roles—and  that  countries  with  the  potential  for  becoming 
reserve currencies have on several occasions actively resisted 
their acquiring this role—should, however, cause one to stop 
and think whether there may be another side to the case. The 
reasons for resisting a reserve-currency role (as classically laid 
out in Bergsten 1975) are
n	 dislike of the prospect of becoming a large gross short-term 
debtor, because of the instability that peremptory with-
drawal of those debts could create. Dislike of the cost of 
building up large short-term assets to completely eliminate 
any such threat;
n	 dislike of the likely instability of a multiple reserve curren-
cy system, as monetary authorities switch between reserve 
currencies in search of enhanced yield; and
n	 the leverage over debtor-country policy that indebtedness 
gives to creditor countries, who at the same time accuse the 
debtor country of enjoying exorbitant privileges.
Perhaps China would avoid such dangers. It is conceivable 
that the build-up of renminbi reserves would be accomplished 
exclusively through capital outflows, with a creditor position 
being maintained throughout (like pre–World War I Britain, 
unlike contemporary America). Perhaps the fears of a multiple 
reserve currency system being unstable are a myth, or perhaps 
the Chinese believe that the renminbi might achieve a monopo-
ly position. Perhaps China would avoid giving foreigners lever-
age over its policies and be indifferent to the opinions of other 
countries about it. But even if it sees net advantages down the 
road in the renminbi becoming a reserve currency, its position 
is still defensible if it judges that the discounted net advantages 
of this do not outweigh the clear net advantage of replacing or 
at least supplementing the dollar by the SDR in the short and 
medium terms. 
Another possibility is that China actually believes what the 
governor of the People’s Bank of China said about the virtues of 
an international order. Perhaps, perish the thought, he actually 
means what he said about how an international money should 
have a stable value, rules-based issuance, and manageable supply, 
rather than that the supply of reserve assets should be governed 
by the economic conditions and sovereign interests of a particu-
lar country. I think he overestimates the extent to which it is 
conceivable that an international money can abandon the prac-
tices that have been cultivated in the past 40 years, but none-
theless he seems to me to exhibit a better grasp of present-day 
realities than some who consider themselves economic realists.
Us inTeresTs
It is often supposed that the United States has a strong national 
interest against seeing any extension in the role of the SDR, 
because such an extension will inevitably come in the short run 
at the cost of curtailing the dollar’s international role. Of course, 
this implies that the US leadership role in creating the SDR 
and urging its activation was misconceived. In fact the calculus 
seems to be quite ambiguous: It is the obverse of that outlined 
for China’s long-run interests. The United States gains by virtue 
of the ability to finance somewhat more cheaply its foreign debt 
(technically known as the “seigniorage” benefit) and by being 
assured  that  deficits  will  be  financed  under  normal  circum-
stances by foreign monetary authorities. But it loses by virtue of 
its susceptibility to sudden large-scale capital outflows caused by 
past build-up of liabilities (Bergsten 2009). Note that measures 
of large-scale indebtedness may alarm not just foreigners but 
also local investors, who have historically often been the first to 
engage in capital flight, driven by informational advantages.
The world may be destined to see a multiple reserve curren-
cy system in the coming years, irrespective of whether or not 
the role of the SDR is expanded. The euro is now sufficiently 
widely accepted and held that an effort to avoid reserve-currency 
status by the European Central Bank (ECB) seems unlikely to be 
attempted and, if attempted, to succeed. 
However, a larger SDR role in such a system might help 
to stabilize it, at least if there were also a substitution account. 
Assuming that this role were one-way (i.e., a dollar holder would 
have  the  right  to  present  dollars  to  the  account  and  receive 
SDRs in exchange but not to exchange those SDRs for a reserve 
currency), the substitution account would enable surplus dollars 
The interests of major reserve-
currency countries, like the United 
States and potentially China, can be 
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to be disposed of without pressuring exchange markets, while 
taking some of the reserves out of the pool that might contribute 
to such pressures. 
Of course, what happens to the dollars placed by other 
countries in the substitution account is of importance in assess-
ing US national interests. As outlined in the earlier section, 
there are three possibilities:
1.  The United States abides by the normal rules of the IMF 
and  acquires  an  SDR-denominated  liability.  Richard 
Cooper (2009) asserts that such an arrangement would be 
a “show-stopper” for the United States, since “no Congress 
would  provide  an  unconditional  guarantee  of  value  for 
assets, which, though issued by the US government, were 
issued in US dollars and voluntarily acquired by foreign 
parties.”  One  wonders  for  how  long  the  US  Congress 
would stop the show if the bottom were falling out of the 
dollar in the foreign exchange market. 
2.  The IMF allows the substitution account to be unbalanced, 
issuing SDR-denominated liabilities and holding dollar-
denominated  assets,  with  the  membership  as  a  whole 
making up any difference in value (e.g., by exploiting the 
IMF’s gold holdings). This arrangement seems at least as 
likely to be a show-stopper for the rest of the world. Fred 
Bergsten argues (in a conversation with me) that the rest of 
the world should be prepared to accept some risk since the 
substitution account would be providing the global public 
good of stability, but other countries might focus on the 
fact that such an arrangement would enable the United 
States to inflate away its debts more readily.
3.  The IMF aims to work gradually toward a situation in 
which the assets of the substitution account matched its 
SDR-denominated liabilities, by selling dollar assets and 
purchasing those denominated in euros, yen, and pound 
sterling. This would merely postpone the pressure on the 
dollar that a substitution account is intended to avoid.
The question of denominating a substitution account seems 
destined to be once again the most difficult item in the negotia-
tion of any such account. Given that the expected present values 
of assets in the different currencies that compose the SDR are 
presumably held equal by arbitrage in the private market, it 
would be a quarrel exclusively about who holds the risk. 
However, the fact that the United States would have a liabil-
ity whose real value was decreased by a self-induced inflation 
would be regarded by some as providing it with an incentive to 
inflate. Such an incentive could be eliminated by indexing the 
dollar debt to the excess of US inflation over the weighted mean 
of that in the other currencies in the basket.
resT of WorlD inTeresTs
The rest of the world needs to be divided into countries or 
regions that can hope to attain reserve-currency status and those 
that do not have any realistic hopes of this. The interests of the 
former countries—those that share the euro, perhaps Japan and 
the United Kingdom, conceivably Switzerland, one day maybe 
India—are  again  ambiguous,  involving  weighing  benefits  of 
seigniorage and more automatic financing of payments deficits 
during normal times against enhanced dangers of a run and the 
consequential  disruption  of  monetary  policy.  The  benefit  of 
more automatic financing of a payments deficit becomes more 
questionable the more marginal the reserve currency: It can 
be disregarded for Switzerland (which anyway does not have 
payments deficits to be financed) and probably for Japan and 
the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom, and maybe also 
Japan, the dangers of a run surely outweigh whatever seignior-
age benefits the countries still derive from use of their currencies 
as reserve currencies. The attractions of gaining a share of the 
seigniorage benefits through SDR issue seem less problematic.
Most countries, however, do not have any realistic expec-
tation  that  their  currency  may  some  day  become  a  reserve 
currency. For them there is a clear advantage in boosting the 
role of the SDR and achieving a portion of the seigniorage 
gains, as outlined in the section on “The Monetary Domain,” 
unless, at least, they still hanker after a money that is “backed” 
by something. One wonders what else lies behind the evidence 
of reluctance to back an SDR solution that their behavior has 
revealed. Could it be that the officials lauded by Fritz Mach-
lup were unique and that the average official is (like Swami) as 
wedded to fallacious doctrines as he imagined them to be?
ConClUDing reMarks
SDRs were created to be a central bank money and are well-
designed for that role. Large regular SDR allocations would be a 
mechanism to reduce the inconsistency of payments objectives, 
one that involves a far fairer distribution of seigniorage than 
otherwise seems conceivable. The interests of major reserve-
currency countries, like the United States and potentially China, 
can be disputed, but they too might benefit from an enhanced 
role of the SDR. 
Large regular SDR allocations could play 
a key role in ensuring that payments 
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